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The UK has an opt-in system of consent for postmortem organ donation. More
specifically, the Human Tissue Act 2004 prohibits the removal, storage, and use
of organs postmortem for a range of ‘‘scheduled purposes’’—which include
transplantation—unless ‘‘appropriate consent’’ has been given.1 Appropriate
consent can be given by the donor premortem by signing and carrying a donor
card, or by opting in to a donor registry. In the UK only 25 percent of the pop-
ulation is registered, although a much higher percentage of these people claim to
be willing to donate.2 Although such evidence must be taken with caution—it is
all too easy to say that we are in favor of doing something when we don’t have
to commit to doing it—it would seem that many individuals’ preferences and
wishes are not acknowledged. That is, many individuals seem to be willing to
consent but, in fact, do not get around to making an explicit act that signals, and
provides evidence of, their consenting. This is, perhaps, not surprising. There are
familiar kinds of psychological inertia that may stand in the way of turning our
wishes or desires into an explicit, public commitment.3 This deficit in explicit
consent might not be a problem if there were a surplus of organs. But each year,
many people suffer greatly, and many die, while waiting for transplants.4 An in-
crease in organ donation would thus serve to benefit many, in substantive and
important ways. Although the deceased donor has no use for her organs, a recipient
is given additional years of life or an improved quality of life. With this striking
contrast in costs and benefits in view, one tempting solution is an opt-out system.
Rather than requiring an explicit act that signals, and provides evidence of,
consent, opt-out systems presume the consent of individuals unless the agent
chooses to opt out. That is, the onus is put on the individual to explicitly signal
(and provide evidence of) a refusal to allow his or her organs to be used.5 Opt-out
systems require institutions and systems to be in place to ensure that individuals
know that it is within their power to opt out, and to offer them the opportunity
to opt out in an easy, costless way. Given people’s apparent inertia with regard to
explicitly signaling preferences that they claim to have, opt-out systems seem to
allow increased procurement of organs in an unproblematic way.
But opt-out systems are taken to be problematic for a number of reasons. First,
presumed consent is not an explicit act of consent—indeed, for some, it is not
consent at all.6 Explicit acts of consent are actions by which an agent knowingly
expresses her willingness to set aside certain rights that she has. But inaction, it
may seem, cannot perform this role in the same way, or with the same degree of
assurance. An agent’s inaction may reflect her ignorance or her decisional inertia,
rather than being an expression of a decision to refrain from opting out.
We have already noted that an appeal to people’s expressed attitudes about
organ donation may not correlate with the decisions they would actually make.
Respondents recognize that organ donation is an estimable thing to do. It is all
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too easy to say that one is in favor of x or that one will do y when there is nothing
about the communicative context that binds one to doing so. Saying is one thing;
doing is another. So the aforementioned line of argument in favor of an opt-out
system (that it is simply taking up the slack left by our decisional inertia) is
questionable.
Another broad concern about opt-out systems is that such systems are politically
sensitive. In a world in which public opinion matters to policymakers and in which
media actors have their own interests and agendas, the change from an opt-in to an
opt-out system would raise difficulties. For example, consider the following remark
in an opinion piece on the website of the UK’s right-of-center Spectator magazine,
made during the UK Organ Donation Taskforce’s deliberations:
I object to the principle that I have to take a step, or sign a form, or tick
a box to prevent the State from taking ownership of my corpse. . . . What
the Prime Minister now proposes is effectively the nationalisation of the
body—with a new ‘‘right’’ to opt out of the otherwise automatic procedure
that your corpse will be stripped of organs for recycling. I am squeamish
at the suggestion that my dead body is grabbed by the State, a bit like
a biological inheritance tax, unless I take the step of withdrawing my
‘‘presumed consent.’’7
It is all too easy to represent opting out as part of an ever-expanding reach of state
power, or as indicating the diminishment of individual liberty.
So, there are problems with an explicit consent (opt-in) model and a presumed
consent (opt-out)model. A recent proposal about organdonation seeks to avoid the
problems associated with both of these models while, at the same time, increasing
the supply of organs for transplant.
The basic argument runs thus: if it is wrong of people to refuse consent to
donation, then we may be permitted to take their organs, although they
have not actually consented (explicitly or implicitly). We need not presume
anything about whether someone would actually have consented, given
the opportunity rather, we are entitled to treat them as if they had, simply
because it would be wrong of them not to do so.8
This is a normative consent model for organ donation. The aim here is to clarify and
explain this model; in doing so we will see that, first, it is misleading to frame it as
a ‘‘consent’’ model at all—normative consent is not consent. Second, if the theory is
defensible, although it may have something in common with opt-out models, it
implies an extremely radical departure from standard opt-out models given that it in
fact rejects the assumption that the use of organs postmortem is prohibited without
consent. It should be stressed here that our focus is an abstract, philosophical one,
and, as such, we must leave it to others to assess how the normative consent
proposal might be implemented—or might be impossible to implement—in this or
that specific jurisdiction.
What Is Normative Consent?
The idea of normative consent is drawn from the political philosopher David
Estlund, who uses it in a different context.9 Estlund’s concern is with consent
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theories of political authority, in which the presumed or hypothetical consent
of citizens is the source of political authority. Such theories are notoriously
problematic: how can anything other than actual acts of consent by citizens
justify the authority of the state? This question has much in common with the
challenge faced by opt-out systems: how can anything other than actual acts of
consent justify the use of organs postmortem? A little more detail of Estlund’s
theory will help. Consent theories of political authority involve two assumptions:
1) Consent is necessary for political authority.
2) Consent is sufficient for political authority unless consent is invalid or
nullified (nullity conditions).
Nullity conditions include coercion, ignorance, and deception. An act of consent
only has normative force if it is uncoerced and adequately informed. Estlund then
argues that there are normative nullity conditions for both consent and refusals. The
idea of normative nullity condition is that an act of consent (or refusal) is invalid or
nullified if the agent ought not to consent (or refuse) in that context. These claims
are then used to derive the claim that in some contexts an invalid refusal can have
the same normative force as a valid act of consent. This may seem very odd, but
Estlund offers the following kind of example. Suppose that there is a plane crash in
which an experienced flight attendant is trying to save lives. She tells the uninjured
passengers, ‘‘Look, we can save these people, but you need to do what I say.’’
Estlund suggests not only that it would be wrong of a passenger not to consent to
the authority of the flight attendant, but that, if he did not, then his refusal is
nullified for normative reasons. The passenger is not exempt from the obligation to
assist simply because he does not accept the obligation. The passenger is thus
under the same obligation that he would have been under had he consented.
In this case there is a normative nullity condition, such that the invalidated refusal
has the same normative force as valid consent. Estlund applies this idea more
generally to the justification of political authority: in some cases political authority
does not need to be based on the actual consent of citizens but should be based on
their normative consent—on the consent that they ought to give, whether or not
they give it. It is this line of thought that Saunders applies to organ donation. Given
that postmortem organ donation is of minimal cost to the donor and can be of vast
benefit to recipients, there is a strong, prima facie duty to donate. Because of this
obligation, a person’s absence of consent can be nullified. Given that people ought
to consent, ‘‘we are entitled to treat them as if they had [consented], simply because
it would be wrong of them not to do so.’’10 The normative consent model is not to be
confused with a version of presumed consent. It is not that we can presume that
people would consent because (1) they will, in general, decide to do what is right or
because (2) there is evidence that many would explicitly consent but fail to do so for
reasons of inertia. Rather, the argument is a normative one: the strength of the duty
to donate nullifies the absence of an act of consent.
Some Initial Objections to Normative Consent
Some have objected that a normative consent system underestimates the costs,
risks, and harms associated with organ donation (e.g., distress caused to relatives
by the removal of organs without explicit prior consent).11 However, such an
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objection could, in principle, be met in a way that preserves the normative
consent model. First, we might factor in an additional power of family veto,
although this power would be more explicit and coherently formulated than the
current UK de facto practice. Second, the normative consent theorist could run
a more subtle consequentialist argument that factors in these costs: although the
harms and costs are not negligible, they are vastly outweighed by lives saved.
A second line of objection is that normative consent is nothing more than organ
conscription.12 But this objection misunderstands the nature of the model. The
model is designed as an improvement on presumed consent justifications that
underpin an opt-out model. It is not meant to be the basis for a conscription
model. As we shall see subsequently, people still have the option of opting out,
perhaps for justifiable reasons (e.g., religious beliefs) or even for unjustifiable
reasons (they don’t want to, they have crazy beliefs that the prime minister wants
to ‘‘nationalize’’ their body, etc.). Some people may wrongly opt out, but the
normative consent model seeks to retain a vestige of the importance of individual
autonomy. The model targets the silent, inert masses who make no act of consent
or refusal. As Saunders puts it, for those who do not opt out, ‘‘we are allowed to
use their organs, not because they have actually consented or because we
presume consent on their part, but simply because they morally ought to consent
and that makes their lack of actual consent normatively irrelevant.’’13
A third, related objection is that the model paves the way for a ‘‘totalitarian’’
system.14 But, as with the previous objection, this seems to misunderstand the nature
of the proposed system. Totalitarian systems tend not to give much weight to opting
out (imagine a dictator who says, ‘‘All must cut down their trees to provide wood for
the state . . . unless you don’t want to, in which case, please opt out’’).15
Are There Normative Nullity Conditions on Consent?
Although these initial objections do not undermine the normative consent model,
there is something problematic about it. In particular, normative consent theory
rests on the idea that there are normative nullity conditions on consent. What could
a normative nullity condition be? Consider the French dwarf tossing case in the
early 1990s: the parties all consented, but the consent was deemed to fail to render
the practice permissible (for dignitarian reasons).16 So, this might seem to be a nice
example of a normative nullity condition. The fact that the participants ought not to
engage in the activity renders their consent invalid. But is this really a normative
nullity condition? Rather than holding that there are nullity conditions that have
nothing directly to do with the misdirection or overwhelming of the right-holder’s
will, we can view such cases in a different, and more plausible, way.
The following list illustrates how things seemed to the participants in the
dwarf throwing (both thrower and ‘‘throwee’’):
d Normative start position: S is under a conditional obligation to refrain from
tossing R in the air, unless S consents.
d Normative act: R validly consents to S’s proposal [to toss him in the air].
d Normative end position: S is not prohibited from tossing R in the air.
But the French court’s judgment is that the participants were simply wrong to
frame the normative context in this way. In particular, they reject the participants’
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construal of the normative starting position. The courts decided, on dignitarian
grounds, that some claim rights (like the right of a dwarf not to be tossed in the
air) are inviolable, and they cannot be waived. In such a context it is true that
consent cannot play a normative role, but this is not because the consent is
nullified but because, given the normative context, consent is not applicable.
Nullification (or invalidity) is not the same as a lack of applicability. For example,
suppose I falsely assume that I have the power to waive some of your rights.
I ‘‘permit’’ someone else to take your car, or have sex with you. It would be bizarre to
claim that this error about the normative situation is a case in which my consent is
rendered invalid because I ought not to do so: it simply has no role to play.
The same kind of problem arises with Estlund’s own example noted previously.
The unhelpful survivor views himself as being under no obligation to obey the flight
attendant. Estlund claims that the survivor is under an obligation. If Estlund is right,
then this means that the normative starting position is one in which the survivor is
simply wrong about the obligations he is under. So, what the example shows is not
that there are additional normative nullity conditions for consent, but only that there
can be errors about what types of obligations an agent is under, or what rights the
agent has: someone may wrongly assume that he or she is in a context in which
rights are waivable or that an obligation is conditional on consent. Someone may
mistakenly think that he or she is in a context in which consent can play a normative
role, when it cannot.
At this point the normative consent theorist might reply that this is a mere
terminological quibble about what we mean by ‘‘nullity conditions.’’ In response,
we might point out that what matters here is that we are clear about the very
important differences between the familiar will-involving nullity conditions and
the normative nullity conditions. Standard nullity and validity conditions are
conditions that an act fails to meet (because the agent’s will has been forced or
misdirected). But it is an act made in a context in which consent—considered as
a type of action—can and would have normative force. That is, the particular
(seeming) act of consent is nullified in a context in which the type of normatively
transformative action (giving consent) is appropriate. In contrast, the normative
consent theorist’s nullity condition comes into play in contexts in which the type
of action—giving consent—has no role to play. Given these very substantive
differences, it is misleading to use the same term as that used for will-involving
nullity conditions like coercion and deception.
The Symmetry Problem
So far we have seen that normative consent theory seems to involve a fallacious
move right at the start, conflating nullity conditions with substantive normative
claims about what we are obliged or permitted to do. Suppose we set aside this
worry for now. Estlund wants to apply this notion of a nullity condition to acts of
refusal rather than acts of consent. The unhelpful person’s refusal to assist is
nullified because they ought not to refuse. But, Estlund notes, there is a peculiar
asymmetry here. Standardly a null—or invalid—refusal will leave things as they are.
This is because the normative change requires a positive act. For example, suppose
someone is coerced into refusing to sign a contract. The nullifying effect of this is not
to make it as if the person had validly signed the contract; it is, rather, to leave the
person without having undertaken the obligation.
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So why does Estlund think that a nullified refusal should have the same effect
as a valid consent? There is a simple enough explanation (although this is not one
that Estlund would endorse). The explanation is that normative consent theory
conflates substantive normative claims with nullity conditions. Given this
conflation, it is perhaps not surprising that in these special ‘‘normative’’ nullity
cases Estlund thinks that a (normatively) null refusal has the same effects as valid
consent.
We have already made use of a simple template that captures normative
change: one that takes us from a normative start position, via a normative act, to a
normative end position. Suppose we focus on a normative end position:
d Normative end position: A is under an obligation to B to do F.
What Estlund’s normative consent theory seems to come down to is the fact that
we might be able to reach this end position in two different ways.
1) A two-step route via a normative act:
d Normative start position: A is under no obligation to B to do F.
d Normative act: A consents to be under an obligation to B to do F.
2) A direct substantive route without any normative act:
d Normative start position: A is under an obligation to B to do F.
If we believe that the direct substantive route is the only correct one, then we
simply deny that consent has a role in reaching the end position—although
people might mistakenly think that the consent route was correct. Let us return to
the flight attendant example. The unhelpful passenger construes the normative
situation as one in which a consent route is appropriate—type (1)—and he
believes that if he refuses (or fails to consent), he will not reach the normative end
position of being under an obligation to the flight attendant. Estlund, in contrast,
argues that the correct assessment of the normative situation is type (2): the
passenger is under an obligation to obey whether or not he refuses. But all that this
shows us is that there can be two different routes by which A can be placed under
an obligation to B (one involving consent and the other not) and that agents can be
in disagreement about which is the correct construal of the normative situation. If
the direct substantive route is correct, then acts of consent or refusal are
epiphenomenal or redundant. But this is, once again, just to insist that consent
has no role (and not, as it might seem, that it is applicable but nullified).
Normative Consent and Organ Donation
Our analysis so far makes it clear why normative consent theory might seem to
be applicable to organ donation in a useful way: in both cases theorists face the
challenge of how a lack of explicit consent might have normative force. One point
to note is that Estlund’s theory is focused on consent as agreement. But consent in
organ donation is permissive.17 In Estlund’s examples, at the normative starting
point, a citizen is under no obligation to certain parties (those who constitute the
government) but at the normative end position she is under such an obligation:
normative consent is meant to provide the bridge between these two positions.
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For permissive consent, by way of contrast, the normative starting point is as
follows:
d Normative start position: It is impermissible for S to do F unless R consents.
In the case of organ donation, the start position involves a prohibition against the
removal, storage, and use of organs for transplant unless appropriate consent is
given. The consent here is permissive: in giving consent, the potential donor—let
us leave aside family consent—renders a type of action permissible that would
otherwise be prohibited. Now, all agree that there are good, but defeasible,
reasons to gain organs for transplant (for S to do F): such actions serve to benefit
others in substantive and important ways. But the prohibition against S’s doing F
stands as an obstacle to doing F. The obstacle is removed if R explicitly consents.
But what of those who do not consent, and what of the inertia that may stand in
the way of our explicitly expressing and recording our consent? At this point
a presumed consent theorist would direct her focus on what it is to consent. For
the presumed consent theorist, an absence of explicit consent does not leave the
prohibition in place, provided that there are sufficient opportunities for refusal.
d Normative act: R refrains from signaling her refusal (and, given that there is
ample, known opportunity to do so, R can be presumed to consent).
d Normative end position: It is permissible for S to do F.
But how does normative consent theory deal with the obstacle posed by a lack of
explicit consent? Here there seem to be two routes that the theory follows, both of
which are problematic, but for different reasons.
Normative Consent Theory: Conservative Version
The first route is a conservative one. That is, it accepts the standard normative
start position that removing and using organs is prohibited without consent.
Some aspects of Saunders’s discussion suggest that this is what the normative
consent theory is committed to. Consider the following: ‘‘Organ donation saves
(and improves) lives, which creates a prima facie duty to donate. Most people
probably can save lives at little, if any, cost to themselves (I deal with possible
excuses, such as conscientious objections, in the following section), placing them
under a duty to consent.’’18 Here it looks like a requirement to gain consent is
retained as part of the normative start position; consent is required but people are
under a duty to give it. Or, consider the following remark about the role of
refusals (which we will return to subsequently in more detail): ‘‘The right
[people] have to their body like many other rights (e.g., free speech or property)
includes the right to do wrong, by refusing to let someone use their organs. Their
explicit refusal of consent still has force, as when one partner refuses sexual
contact.’’19 This, again, makes it look as if consent is in the picture: if it were not,
how can one refuse to give it? Similarly, for those who do not refuse, ‘‘we are
allowed to use their organs, not because they have actually consented or because
we presume consent on their part, but simply because they morally ought to
consent and that makes their lack of actual consent normatively irrelevant.’’20
Once again, this makes it look like consent has a normative role to play; one can
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give it or refuse it, but because one is under a duty to consent, a lack of consent
plays the same role as consent normally would.
But does the idea of a duty to consent make sense? Saunders talks of its being
‘‘wrong of people to refuse consent to donation.’’ Indeed, more strongly, he claims
that ‘‘the argument rests on one crucial premise: that it is wrong for (most) people to
withhold their consent to post-mortem organ donation.’’21 This idea, that it is wrong
to withhold consent, features again in the summary that introduced normative con-
sent theory previously: ‘‘If it is wrong of people to refuse consent to donation, then
we may be permitted to take their organs, although they have not actually consented
(explicitly or implicitly).’’22
But suppose we accept this one ‘‘crucial premise’’ that it is wrong of people to
refuse to consent. This is not sufficient for the normative consent theory to offer an
alternative to current opt-out models. If we hold onto the standard normative start
position—it is prohibited to use organs without consent—then the mere fact that it is
wrong of a person not to consent does not by itself remove the prohibition. It may be
wrong of me not to consent to a poor person’s taking possessions of mine that I have
little use for, but the wrongness by itself does not render their taking them per-
missible. Similarly, in the context of organ donation, wemight hold that thosewho do
not currently opt in are wrong in their failure to do so, but the mere fact of the
wrongnessof their actiondoesnotmake itpermissible touse their organspostmortem.
So, it seems that normative consent theory needs something stronger: rather
than holding that it is merely wrong not to give consent, perhaps the claim is that
people are obliged to give consent. But this stronger assumption is in tension
with the normative start position that we are taking for granted:
d Normative start position: It is impermissible for S to do F unless R consents.
d Additional assumption: R is obliged to consent to S’s doing F.
How strong is this obligation? It looks as though the obligation must be quite
strong, strong enough to override the prohibition in the normative starting
position. But if R is strongly obliged to consent to S’s doing F, then R has no right
not to do so. But this means that the notion of consent (and refusal) is redundant
in this context. In what sense can one freely give one’s consent to something if
one is not permitted not to do so? The starting position is one in which organ use
is prohibited without consent, but if all are obliged to consent, there seems to be
nothing anyone can do to bring about normative change.
However, it is clear that Saunders does not intend the obligation to be so strong.
Saunders argues that although we are obliged to give consent to the use of organs
postmortem, in some cases it may be justifiable to refuse to give consent: ‘‘Note that I
only claim that most people are under an obligation to donate their organs after
death. It is permissible for them to withhold their organs only when donation would
impose costs upon them that they are not required to bear to save a life.’’23 Those
whose religious convictions prohibit donation might be justified in their refusal.
However, Saunders also allows that people should be permitted to opt out, even if
postmortem donation would not impose substantial costs or burdens on them.
These people are rather like those who refuse to save a drowning child
because they do not want to get their clothes wet. Their action may be
morally unjustifiable, but it does not follow that we should refuse to
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respect their wishes. If they explicitly dissent, by opting out of the
system, then we do not use their organs. Patients are generally allowed
to refuse medical interventions, even for bad reasons.24
But this means that the theory entails the following:
d Conclusion: R is obliged to consent to S’s doing F, unless R refuses.
On this conservative interpretation, organ use is prohibited without consent.
However, not only is it wrong not to consent, but we are obliged to consent. This
undermines the normative relevance of consent: if it is obligatory, we are not free
to give our consent. The theory also gives a role to refusals, but this makes it look
like we are capable of refusing to permit the use of our organs, but not capable of
consenting to their use, even though consent is required for their use.
The tensions here all arise because, according to this conservative interpretation,
we are keeping the normative starting position intact. However the conservative
interpretation of the theory is not the only one possible.
Normative Consent Theory: Radical Version
Other remarks made by Saunders suggest a radical departure from the standard
normative starting point: ‘‘Framing the issue in terms of presumed consent, however,
is problematical, because it suggests that actual consent is necessary . . . this is only
problematical if we continue to accept the premise that we need someone’s actual
consent before we can use their organs.’’25 This suggests an alternative normative
starting point:
d Normative starting point (radical): It is permissible for S to do F without R’s
consent.
This normative starting point allows us to make sense of the role that the normative
consent theory gives to refusals but in a way that involves a radical departure from
standard opt-out models. In standard models it is consent that has the normative
transformative power. Consent renders permissible what would otherwise be
prohibited. In this radical version of normative consent theory, however, consent is
not necessary; it is refusals (or vetoes) that have normative power. An individual
can prohibit what is permissible without her refusal.
The radical version avoids some of the problems of the conservative version.
There is no puzzle about how people can be obliged to consent, because on the
radical version, their consent is not necessary. In the radical version, consent has no
role to play, except, bizarrely, when someone has already exercised their power of
refusal. Suppose a person has opted out and thus has activated the prohibition of
the use of her organs postmortem. Suppose she then changes her mind. Presumably
the prohibition is waivable, so insofar as she is able to revoke her refusal, she can
give consent to the use of her organs. But this means that according to normative
consent theory unless one has previously refused to permit the use of one’s organs,
one cannot consent to their use.
The radical version also allows us to make sense of the role of refusals. The
problem with the conservative version was that it retained a starting position in
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which consent has an essential normative role to play. But once we take away the
assumption that consent is necessary, we can realign things, with refusals being given
normative power. The difference is that the default—the starting position—is that the
use of organs is permissible, unless people exercise their autonomy in refusing.
In order to make the normative consent theory intelligible and coherent, we
have to view it as one that rejects the normative start position in which consent
is necessary for permissible use of organs postmortem. In this version of the
theory, consent has no role to play, except in the unusual circumstances noted
previously. This interpretation is thus more coherent, but it is not a consent
theory.
Conclusion
Normative consent theory is meant to provide an alternative to standard opt-out
models of organ donation. The key question is how organ use postmortem can be
permissible without explicit consent. Estlund’s normative consent theory faces—at
an abstract level—a similar conceptual problem: how, in consent theories of political
obligation, can such obligations be grounded without explicit consent? But Estlund’s
normative consent theory is best viewed not as one that identifies a novel way in
which consent plays a normative role but as one that denies the necessity of consent
to the normative issues at hand: because we are obliged to undertake certain
obligations, refusal is not an option, and consent has no role to play. Estlund’s
normative consent theory is not a consent theory at all.
Saunders seeks to draw on Estlund’s theory but is torn in different directions in
doing so. In its conservative interpretation, Saunders’s theory seeks to hold onto
a role for consent. However, the fact that it is wrong not to give consent does not
transform the normative landscape. It may already be wrong for us not to consent
to permit use of our organs postmortem, but that fact by itself does not render
their use permissible. On the other hand, if it is argued that we are obliged to
permit the use of our organs, the notion of consent is otiose. If we then introduce
the right to refuse, we seem to end up with a strong obligation to consent, unless
we don’t want to. The conservative interpretation is thus unstable, because it
seeks to retain the idea that consent is necessary for permissible use of organs
while at the same time introducing an obligation to consent that rules out its
operation (and then, to round things off, it seeks to acknowledge the importance
of autonomy by giving a role to refusals).
The radical variant is more in keeping with our interpretation of Estlund’s theory.
That is, rather than involving the claim that consent is somehow obligatory, it simply
involves a rejection of the original normative starting position in which consent is
necessary. According to the radical version, the use of organs is permissible without
consent, but a prohibition can be activated by an act of refusal. It should be clear that
it is very misleading to call normative consent theory a consent theory at all, for
consent has no role at all to play, save in those cases in which a previous
refusal—which activated a prohibition—is revoked.
Saunders does note that the theory may seem to have little to do with consent
but responds that the theory is framed in terms of consent because ‘‘this is the way
the debate has been phrased up to now. More importantly, normative consent
retains some connection to the will. . . . An opt-out system allows reluctant donors
to veto the use of their organs.’’26
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But this is disingenuous. Consent, in this model, only comes into play as the
revocation of a prior refusal. To call the theory a normative consent model of organ
donation is almost an oxymoron, because, given the normative starting position,
consent has (almost) no role to play. Perhaps this is one good reason why the theory
is framed in terms of consent (even when it renders consent otiose): the label con-
ceals the radical nature of the model.
There is something appealing about the theory, at least considered in
abstraction: it performs a neat balancing act, one that gives due weight to the
consequentialist case for an obligation to donate while retaining a role for the
individual will via the power to refuse. But we should be clear from the start that
it is not a consent theory. Normative consent is not consent!
The normative ‘‘consent’’ model does avoid some of the technical problems that
plague the presumed consent model (it does not have to secure a plausible con-
ception of presumed consent that has normative force). But there are other reasons
why presumed consent theories are taken to be objectionable. For example, one
reason why many members of the public (and journalists of a particular bent) are
opposed to opt-out systems is that they leave the onus on the individuals to ensure
that they have opted out, and they may not know that they can, they may not
understand how to, or they may be confused about the whole process. Such people,
so the worry goes, risk having their organs removed against their will. The nor-
mative (non-consent) theory meets this objection with the following reply: ‘‘It is
permissible to use your organs unless you activate a prohibition by opting out.’’ It is
worth keeping in mind how such a theory would be met if proposed as public
policy. Presumed consent theory shares with opt-out theory the assumption that the
use of organs postmortem is impermissible without consent. It is not clear to me that
a theory that starts with the premise that postmortem use is permissible without
consent—unless a refusal is made—would fare any better in a politically unreceptive
or opposed media. If people are willing to campaign against presumed consent
because it involves the state’s ‘‘ownership’’ (or even ‘‘nationalization’’) of their
bodies, the model here is unlikely to be any more palatable.
However, the normative consent theory is not meant to be a legal theory, nor is
it meant to be an immediate proposal for policy revision. The argument is an
ethical one: given that our organs are of no use to us after death, and given that
their use can save and greatly improve the lives of others, the normative starting
point that involves a prohibition without consent may not be ethically justifiable.
There is, to my mind, something important in this line of thought, but it ought
not to be cast in terms of providing a consent theory of organ donation.
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